The Ricardian Model Part 1: Dornbush, Fischer and Samuelson (1977)

International Trade (PhD), Fall 2019

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Roadmap

– In the next two classes, I show how the Armington gravity equation can be reproduced using a Ricardian model that builds on a rich micro-foundation.

– Today, I cover the two-country many goods Ricardian model: *Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977, AER)*

– Next class, I cover the many-country, many goods Ricardian model: *Eaton and Kortum (2002, Econometrica)*

Environment

- Two countries: Home (H) and Foreign (F).
- A continuum of homogeneous goods $z \in [0, 1]$.
- Labor is the only factor of production:
 - Country $\mathfrak{i} \in \{H,F\}$ is populated by $L_{\mathfrak{i}}$ workers.
 - Each worker is paid a wage, w_i .
- Perfect competition + constant returns to scale.

Demand

– The representative consumer in country $j \in \{H,F\}$ has a Cobb-Douglass utility

$$U_{j}(\mathbf{q}) = \int_{0}^{1} b(z) \ln q(z) dz$$

-z indexes the good.

- b(z) is the share of expenditure on good *z*.
- by assumption: $\int_0^1 b(z) dz = 1$

Demand

- Utility maximization implies

$$\begin{cases} p_{H}(z)q_{H}(z) = b(z)Y_{H} \\ p_{F}(z)q_{F}(z) = b(z)Y_{F} \end{cases}$$

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- $p_i(z)q_i(z)$: expenditure on good *z* in country i.
- $Y_i = w_i L_i$: total income in country i

Supply

Let $a_i(z)$ denote the unit labor requirement for producing good z in country i.

Order the goods so that $A(z) \equiv \frac{a_F(z)}{a_H(z)}$ is decreasing.

- H has a comparative advantage in the low-*z* goods.
- F has a comparative advantage in the high-z goods.
- Assume A(z) is strictly monotone.

Supply

- Suppose trade is costless: $p_H(z) = p_F(z) = p(z)$.
- Good z will be produced by ${\sf H}$ if

$$\mathfrak{a}_{\mathsf{H}}(z)w_{\mathsf{H}} < \mathfrak{a}_{\mathsf{F}}(z)w_{\mathsf{F}} \iff \mathsf{A}(z) > rac{w_{\mathsf{F}}}{w_{\mathsf{H}}}$$

– Good z will be produced by F if

$$a_{H}(z)w_{H} > a_{F}(z)w_{F} \iff A(z) < \frac{w_{F}}{w_{H}}$$

– Equilibrium Outcomes:

- 1. relative wage $\omega = \frac{w_{\rm H}}{w_{\rm F}}$
- **2**. cut-off \tilde{z} , such that
 - H produces every good $z \in [0, \tilde{z}]$;
 - F produces every good $z \in [ilde{z}, 1]$.
- Equilibrium Condition 1:

 $A(\tilde{z}) = \omega$

– Let $\theta(\tilde{z}) \equiv \int_0^{\tilde{z}} b(z) dz$ denote the fraction of income spent on goods produced in H.

- **Equilibrium Condition 2** [Balanced Trade]

$$\underbrace{\theta(\tilde{z})w_{\mathsf{F}}\mathsf{L}_{\mathsf{F}}}_{\text{Home exports}} = \underbrace{[1-\theta(\tilde{z})]w_{\mathsf{H}}\mathsf{L}_{\mathsf{H}}}_{\text{Home imports}}$$

- Note that B'(.) > 0.

– Let $\theta(\tilde{z}) \equiv \int_0^{\tilde{z}} b(z) dz$ denote the fraction of income spent on goods produced in H.

- Equilibrium Condition 2 [Balanced Trade]

$$\omega = \frac{\theta(\tilde{z})}{1 - \theta(\tilde{z})} \left(\frac{L_{\rm F}}{L_{\rm H}}\right) \equiv {\rm B}(\tilde{z})$$

- Note that B'(.) > 0.

– Equilibrium conditions 1 and 2 jointly determine (\tilde{z}, ω)



Gains from Trade

- Assign Home labor as the numeraire: $w_{\rm H} = 1$
- After opening to trade
 - $Y_{\rm H} = w_{\rm H} L_{\rm H} = L_{\rm H}$ remains the same
 - $p_H(z)$ remains the same if *z* is not imported
 - $p_H(z)$ decreases if z is imported.
- So, Home gains from trade!

Comparative Statics

Question: What happens if $\frac{L_F}{L_H}$ goes up?

Answer: $\omega = \frac{w_{\rm H}}{w_{\rm E}}$ goes up and \tilde{z} goes down (intuition?)



Welfare Analysis

Claim: if L^F/L^H increases:

- Home's welfare improves
- Foreign's welfare worsens.

Proof

- $Y'_H = Y_H = L_H$, by choice of numeraire ($w_H = 1$).
- If good *z*'s production remains at H:

$$p_{\rm H}(z) = p_{\rm H}(z)'$$

– If goods *z*'s production remains in F:

$$w_F' < w_F \implies p_H(z)' = w_F' \mathfrak{a}_F(z) < p_H(z)$$

– If goods *z*'s production moves to F:

$$w'_F a_F(z) \leqslant a_H(z) \implies p_H(z)' < p_H(z)$$

Trade Costs

- Until now, we assumed costless trade \Longrightarrow $p_H(z) = p_F(z)$
- Suppose trade is subject to an iceberg trade cost, τ :
 - Home will export good *z* if $\tau w_{H} a_{H}(z) \leq w_{F} a_{F}(z)$
 - Foreign will export good *z* if $w_{H}a_{H}(z) \ge \tau w_{F}a_{F}(z)$
- Define \underline{z} such that: $\tau w_H a_H(\underline{z}) = w_F a_F(\underline{z})$
- Define \bar{z} such that: $w_{H}a_{H}(\bar{z}) = \tau w_{F}a_{F}(\bar{z})$
 - Home will produce and export $z \in [0, \underline{z}]$
 - Foreign will produce and export $z \in [\bar{z}, 1]$
 - Goods $z \in [\underline{z}, \overline{z}]$ are non-traded.

Trade Costs



– See Dornbush, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) for the generalized trade balance equation that pins down ω in the presence of trade costs.

Extensions of DFS1977

– Costinot (2009): extends the analytical results to many countries and many goods.

- Matsuyama (2000)
 - Non-homothetic preferences: goods are indexed according to priority.
 - H has a comparative advantage in low-priority goods.
- Eaton, and Kortum (2002)
 - Parametric assumption on the distribution of $a_i(z)$'s.
 - Closed-form gravity equation in a multi-country framework.

A Limitation of the Ricardian Model

– The Ricardian model is silent about **the origins of cross-national productivity differences**.

– A big body of literature on *"Institutions and Trade"* seeks to answer to this question:

Acemoglu, Antras, & Helpman (2007), Antras (2005), Costinot (2009), Levchenko (2007); Nunn (2007); Vogel (2007); Beck (2000), Kletzer & Bardhan (1987); Matsuyama (2005); Manova (2007); Davidson, Martin, & Matusz (1999); Cunat & Melitz (2007), Helpman & Itskhoki (2006).

Institutions and Trade

– Basic Idea: 1

- 1. Even if firms have access to the same technological know-how around the world, institutional differences across countries may affect how firms organize their production process.
- 2. If institutional differences affect productivity relatively more in some sectors, then institutions become source of comparative advantage.

- General Theme:

 Countries with "better institutions" tend to be relatively more productive, and so to specialize, in sectors that are more "institutionally dependent"

¹Borrowed from Costinot and Donaldson's lecture notes.