# The Krugman Model

International Trade (PhD), Fall 2024

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#### **Overview**

- The Krugman model is essentially a multi-country *Dixit-Stiglitz* model
- *Increasing returns to scale* is the driving force behind international trade.
- This is the simplest firm-level model that generates gravity.

#### **Main references**

- Krugman P., *"Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade."* American Economic Review. 1980.
- *[The basics of "Dixit-Stiglitz lite"](http://www.columbia.edu/~jid2106/td/dixitstiglitzbasics.pdf)* by Jonathan Dingel

#### Environment

- Many countries indexed by  $i, n = 1, ..., N$
- Each country hosts many symmetric firms
	- firms are indexed by ω
	- firms supply differentiated varieties and are monopolistically competitive
- Labor is the only factor of production
- Country *i* is endowed with *L<sup>i</sup>* (inelastically-supplied) units of labor
- Trade is balanced:  $D_i = 0 \longrightarrow E_i = Y_i$  ( $\forall i$ )

#### Demand

The representative consumer in country *i* has a CES utility function over differentiated firm-level

varieties from various origin countries:

$$
U_i\left(\mathbf{q}_{1i},...,\mathbf{q}_{Ni}\right)=\left[\sum_{n=1}^N\int_{\omega\in\Omega_n}q_{ni}\left(\omega\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}d\omega\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}
$$

- $-\sigma \geq 1$  is the elasticity of substitution between firm-level varieties.
- Ω*<sup>n</sup>* is the set of all firms operating in origin *n*
- $q_{ni}(\omega)$  is the quantity of firm-level variety  $\omega$  from origin country *n*.

#### Demand

- The representative consumer maximizes utility subject to their budget constraint:

$$
\max_{\mathbf{q}_i} U_i(\mathbf{q}_{1i},...,\mathbf{q}_{Ni}) \qquad s.t. \qquad \sum_{n=1}^N \left[ \int_{\omega \in \Omega_n} p_{ni}(\omega) q_{ni}(\omega) \right] \le E_i
$$

- The firm-level CES demand function implied by utility maximization:

$$
\underbrace{\frac{p_{ni}(\omega) q_{ni}(\omega)}{E_i}}_{\text{expenditure share}} = \left(\frac{p_{ni}(\omega)}{P_i}\right)^{1-\sigma}, \qquad \underbrace{P_i = \left[\sum_{n=1}^N \int_{\omega \in \Omega_n} p_{ni}(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}_{\text{CES price index}}
$$

# Supply – Cost Function

- Firm  $\omega$  pays a sunk entry cost  $w_i f_i$  to operate from country *i*
- Upon entry firm *ω* can sell to any country subject to a constant marginal cost



- Assumption: Firms operating in country *i* are symmetric:

$$
\varphi_i(\omega) = \varphi_i, \qquad \qquad q_{in}(\omega) = q_{in} \qquad (\forall \omega \in \Omega_i)
$$

*N*

- The total cost faced by a typical firm from country *i*:

$$
\text{TC}_i = w_i f_i \, + \, \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i q_{in}
$$

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# Supply – Optimal Pricing

- The market structure is monopolistic competition
- $-$  Firm  $\omega$  sets price to maximize variable profits

$$
p_{in} = \arg \max_{p} \left[ p - \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i \right] q_{in}(p),
$$

where  $q_{in}$  ( $p$ ) is characterized by the CES demand function.

- The optimal price exhibits a constant markup over marginal cost

$$
p_{in} = \underbrace{\sigma}{\underbrace{\sigma-1}_{\text{markup}}} \times \underbrace{1}_{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i
$$

- Let *M<sup>i</sup>* ≡| Ω*<sup>i</sup>* | denote the mass of firms operating in country *i*.
- *M<sup>i</sup>* is determined by free entry (*i.e.*, firms enter until profits are dissipated)

net profits = 
$$
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \left[ \left( p_{in} - \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i \right) q_{in} - w_i f_i = 0 \right]
$$
variable profits from sales to *n*

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$$
p_{in} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i \longrightarrow \frac{1}{\sigma} \sum_{n=1}^N p_{in} q_{in} = w_i f_i \quad \text{(free entry)}
$$

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$$
\xrightarrow{\sum_n p_{in}q_{in}=\sigma w_i f_i} M_i =
$$

$$
M_i = \frac{1}{\sigma f_i} L_i
$$

#### Aggregate Expenditure Shares

- Aggregate expenditure shares can be constructed from firm-level expenditure shares:

$$
\lambda_{in} = \frac{M_i p_{in} q_{in}}{E_n} \qquad \xrightarrow{\text{CES demand}} \qquad \lambda_{in} = \frac{M_i p_{in}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N M_j p_{jn}^{1-\sigma}}
$$

- Accounting for optimal pricing and free entry yields our familiar-looking gravity equation:

$$
\begin{cases}\n p_{in} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i \\
 M_i = L_i / \sigma f_i\n\end{cases}\n\longrightarrow\n\qquad\n\lambda_{in} = \frac{(L_i / f_i) \varphi_i^{\sigma - 1} (\tau_{in} w_i)^{1 - \sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N (L_j / f_j) \varphi_j^{\sigma - 1} (\tau_{jn} w_j)^{1 - \sigma}}
$$

## General Equilibrium

For a given vector of parameters,  $\{\tau_{in}$ ,  $\varphi_i$ ,  $f_i$ ,  $L_i$ ,  $\sigma\}_{i,n}$ , equilibrium is a vector of wages,  $\{w_i\}_i$ , that clear labor markets in all countries:

$$
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \underbrace{\lambda_{in}(w_1, ..., w_N)}_{\text{country } n \text{'s demand for } i \text{'s labor services}} = w_i L_i, \forall i
$$

where the expenditure shares  $(\lambda_{in})$  and total national expenditure  $(E_n)$  are given by

$$
\begin{cases}\n\lambda_{in}(w_1, ..., w_N) = \frac{(L_i/f_i)\varphi_i^{\sigma-1}(\tau_{in}w_i)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N (L_j/f_j)\varphi_j^{\sigma-1}(\tau_{jn}w_j)^{1-\sigma}} & (\forall i, j) \\
E_n(w_n) = w_n L_n & (\forall i, \text{ balance budget})\n\end{cases}
$$

## General Equilibrium (in terms of *Y*)

For a given vector of parameters,  $\{\tau_{in}$ ,  $\varphi_i$ ,  $f_i$ ,  $L_i$ ,  $\sigma\}_{i,n}$ , equilibrium is a vector of GDP levels,  $\{Y_i\}_i$ , that clear labor markets in all countries:

$$
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \underbrace{\lambda_{in}(Y_1, ..., Y_N)}_{\text{country } n \text{'s demand for } i \text{'s labor services}} = Y_i, \forall i
$$

where the expenditure shares  $(\lambda_{in})$  and total national expenditure  $(E_n)$  are given by

$$
\begin{cases}\n\lambda_{in}(Y_1, ..., Y_N) = \frac{\left(L_i^{\sigma}/f_i\right)\varphi_i^{\sigma-1}(\tau_{in}Y_i)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N \left(L_j^{\sigma}/f_j\right)\varphi_j^{\sigma-1}(\tau_{in}Y_j)^{1-\sigma}} & (\forall i, j) \\
E_n(Y_n) = Y_n & (\forall i, \text{ balance budget})\n\end{cases}
$$

#### An Overview of the Krugman Model

- The Krugman model belongs to the quantitative class of models reviewed earlier:

$$
\tilde{\chi}_i \sim f_i^{-1} \left( L_i^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \varphi_i \right)^{\sigma-1}, \qquad \qquad \epsilon \sim \sigma - 1
$$

- The indirect utility or welfare of the representative consumer in country *i* is

$$
W_i = \frac{Y_i}{P_i}, \qquad P_i = \left[ \sum_{n=1}^N \int_{\omega \in \Omega_n} p_{ni} \left( \omega \right)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}
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- The indirect utility or welfare of the representative consumer in country *i* is

$$
W_{i} = \frac{Y_{i}}{P_{i}}, \qquad P_{i} = C \times \left[ \sum_{n=1}^{N} \varphi_{n}^{\sigma-1} L_{n}^{\sigma} (f_{n})^{-1} (\tau_{ni} Y_{n})^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}
$$
  
encapsulates non-country-specific constants

## Krugman *vs.* Neoclassical Trade Models

- The Krugman model predicts similar *ex post* gains from trade (up-to a choice of trade elasticity) as neoclassical models*—e.g.*, Armington, Eaton-Kortum

$$
GT_i \equiv \frac{W_i - W_i^{(autarky)}}{W_i} \sim \text{ gains from trade}
$$

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GT_i = 1 - \lambda_{ii}^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} \sim 1 - \lambda_{ii}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}
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$$
GT_i = 1 - \lambda_{ii}^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} \sim 1 - \lambda_{ii}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}
$$

- It also predict the same *ex ante* welfare impacts in response to a trade cost shock {*τ*ˆ*in*}*i*,*<sup>n</sup>* :

$$
\widehat{W}_i = \frac{\widehat{Y}_i}{\widehat{P}_i}, \qquad \widehat{P}_i = \left[ \sum_n \lambda_{ni} \hat{\tau}_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \widehat{Y}_n^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}
$$

where  $\hat{Y}_i$  can be calculated with data on basline expenditure shares,  $\{\lambda_{in}\}_{i,n}$ , and GDP levels,  $\{Y_i\}_i$ , via the following system:

$$
\widehat{Y}_i Y_i = \sum_{n=1}^N \left[ \frac{\lambda_{in} \,\widehat{\tau}_{in}^{1-\sigma} \,\widehat{Y}_i^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N \lambda_{jn} \,\widehat{\tau}_{jn}^{1-\sigma} \,\widehat{Y}_j^{1-\sigma} \,\widehat{Y}_n^{1-\sigma}} \,\widehat{Y}_n Y_n \right]
$$

## Real GDP and Size: Krugman *vs.* Armington

- Real GDP is characterized by technology parameters, size, and, trade openness:



$$
\frac{Y_i}{P_i} = \frac{A_i \beta_i}{\underbrace{\tau_{ii}}_{\text{Armington}} \times L_i \times \lambda_{ii}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}
$$

# Real GDP and Size: Krugman *vs.* Armington

- Real GDP is characterized by technology parameters, size, and, trade openness:



- The Krugman model predicts that, all else equal, real GDP (*Y*/*P*) increases more than proportional with population size (*L*):

$$
\frac{\partial \ln(Y_i/P_i)}{\partial \ln L_i} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} > 1;
$$
  
Krugman

$$
\frac{\partial \ln \left( Y_i/P_i \right)}{\partial \ln L_i} = 1
$$
Armington

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- **Why?** because of *increasing-returns to scale*, driven by love-for-variety.

## Are the Scale Effects Predicted by Krugman Consistent with Data?



## Are the Scale Effects Predicted by Krugman Consistent with Data?

- Cross-sectional data suggests that *<sup>∂</sup>* ln(*Yi*/*Pi*) *∂* ln *L<sup>i</sup>* < 1, but does it reject the presence of scale economies?
- Not necessarily, because larger countries have higher domestic expenditures shares ( *∂* ln *λii*  $\frac{\partial \ln \lambda_{ii}}{\partial \ln L_i} > 0$ ) and presumably larger domestic trade frictions ( $\frac{\partial \ln \tau_{ii}}{\partial \ln L_i} > 0$ ):

$$
\frac{d \ln(Y_i/P_i)}{d \ln L_i} = \frac{\partial \ln(Y_i/P_i)}{\partial \ln L_i} + \underbrace{\frac{\partial \ln(Y_i/P_i)}{\partial \ln \tau_{ii}} \frac{d \ln \tau_{ii}}{d \ln L_i}}_{=-1} + \underbrace{\frac{\partial \ln(Y_i/P_i)}{\partial \ln \lambda_{ii}} \frac{d \ln \lambda_{ii}}{d \ln L_i}}_{=1/(1-\sigma)<0} = \frac{\partial \ln(Y_i/P_i)}{>0}
$$

- See [Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare, & Saborío-Rodríguez \(2016, AER\)](http://DOI:%2010.1257/aer.20141449) for a formal exploration of the income-size elasticity puzzle.