The Krugman Model

International Trade (PhD), Fall 2024

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Overview

- The Krugman model is essentially a multi-country Dixit-Stiglitz model
- Increasing returns to scale is the driving force behind international trade.
- This is the simplest firm-level model that generates gravity.

Main references

- Krugman P., "Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade." American Economic Review. 1980.
- The basics of "Dixit-Stiglitz lite" by Jonathan Dingel

Environment

- Many countries indexed by i, n = 1, ..., N
- Each country hosts many symmetric firms
 - firms are indexed by $\boldsymbol{\omega}$
 - firms supply differentiated varieties and are monopolistically competitive
- Labor is the only factor of production
- Country i is endowed with L_i (inelastically-supplied) units of labor
- Trade is balanced: $D_i = 0 \longrightarrow E_i = Y_i \quad (\forall i)$

Demand

The representative consumer in country i has a CES utility function over differentiated firm-level

varieties from various origin countries:

$$U_{i}\left(\mathbf{q}_{1i},...,\mathbf{q}_{Ni}\right) = \left[\sum_{n=1}^{N}\int_{\omega\in\Omega_{n}}q_{ni}\left(\omega\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}d\omega\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

- $\sigma \geq 1$ is the elasticity of substitution between firm-level varieties.
- Ω_n is the set of all firms operating in origin n
- $q_{ni}(\omega)$ is the quantity of firm-level variety ω from origin country n.

Demand

- The representative consumer maximizes utility subject to their budget constraint:

$$\max_{\mathbf{q}_{i}} U_{i}(\mathbf{q}_{1i},...,\mathbf{q}_{Ni}) \qquad s.t. \qquad \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left[\int_{\omega \in \Omega_{n}} p_{ni}(\omega) q_{ni}(\omega) \right] \leq E_{i}$$


- The firm-level CES demand function implied by utility maximization:

$$\underbrace{\frac{p_{ni}(\omega)q_{ni}(\omega)}{E_{i}}}_{\text{expenditure share}} = \left(\frac{p_{ni}(\omega)}{P_{i}}\right)^{1-\sigma}, \qquad \underbrace{P_{i} = \left[\sum_{n=1}^{N} \int_{\omega \in \Omega_{n}} p_{ni}(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}_{\text{CES price index}}$$

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Supply – Cost Function

- Firm ω pays a sunk entry cost $w_i f_i$ to operate from country i
- Upon entry firm ω can sell to any country subject to a constant marginal cost



- Assumption: Firms operating in country *i* are symmetric:

$$arphi_{i}\left(\omega
ight)=arphi_{i}, \qquad \qquad q_{in}\left(\omega
ight)=q_{in} \qquad (orall \omega\in\Omega_{i})$$

- The total cost faced by a typical firm from country *i*:

$$ext{TC}_i = w_i f_i + \sum_{n=1}^N rac{1}{arphi_i} au_{in} w_i q_{in}$$

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Supply – Optimal Pricing

- The market structure is monopolistic competition
- Firm ω sets price to maximize variable profits

$$p_{in} = \arg \max_{p} \left[p - \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i \right] q_{in} \left(p \right)$$

where $q_{in}(p)$ is characterized by the CES demand function.

- The optimal price exhibits a constant markup over marginal cost

$$p_{in} = \frac{\sigma}{\underbrace{\sigma-1}}_{\max kup} \times \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i$$

Supply – Number of Firms

- Let $M_i \equiv |\Omega_i|$ denote the mass of firms operating in country *i*.
- M_i is determined by free entry (*i.e.*, firms enter until profits are dissipated)

net profits =
$$\sum_{n=1}^{N} \left[\underbrace{\left(p_{in} - \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i \right) q_{in}}_{\text{variable profits from sales to } n} \right] - w_i f_i = 0$$

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$$p_{in} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i \longrightarrow \frac{1}{\sigma} \sum_{n=1}^N p_{in} q_{in} = w_i f_i \quad (\text{free entry})$$

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- Since total revenue from sales equates wage payments in country i, we can derive a closed-form expression for the mass of firms, M_i :


$$M_i \times \underbrace{\sum_{n}^{\text{sales per firm}}}_{n} = \underbrace{w_i L_i}^{\text{wage bill}} \xrightarrow{\text{free entry}} M_i = \frac{1}{\sigma f_i} L_i$$

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
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$$\xrightarrow{\sum_{n} p_{in}q_{in} = \sigma w_{i}f_{i}}$$



Aggregate Expenditure Shares

- Aggregate expenditure shares can be constructed from firm-level expenditure shares:

$$\lambda_{in} = \frac{M_i p_{in} q_{in}}{E_n} \qquad \xrightarrow{\text{CES demand}} \qquad \lambda_{in} = \frac{M_i p_{in}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N M_j p_{jn}^{1-\sigma}}$$

- Accounting for optimal pricing and free entry yields our familiar-looking gravity equation:

$$\begin{cases} p_{in} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{1}{\varphi_i} \tau_{in} w_i \\ M_i = L_i / \sigma f_i \end{cases} \longrightarrow \qquad \lambda_{in} = \frac{\left(L_i / f_i\right) \varphi_i^{\sigma - 1} \left(\tau_{in} w_i\right)^{1 - \sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N \left(L_j / f_j\right) \varphi_j^{\sigma - 1} \left(\tau_{jn} w_j\right)^{1 - \sigma}} \end{cases}$$

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General Equilibrium

For a given vector of parameters, $\{\tau_{in}, \varphi_i, f_i, L_i, \sigma\}_{i,n}$, equilibrium is a vector of wages, $\{w_i\}_i$, that clear labor markets in all countries:

$$\sum_{n=1}^{N} \underbrace{\lambda_{in}(w_1, ..., w_N) \times E_n(w_n)}_{\text{country } n's \text{ demand for } i's \text{ labor services}} = w_i L_i \quad , \forall i$$

where the expenditure shares (λ_{in}) and total national expenditure (E_n) are given by

$$\begin{cases} \lambda_{in}(w_1, ..., w_N) = \frac{(L_i/f_i)\varphi_i^{\sigma-1}(\tau_{in}w_i)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N (L_j/f_j)\varphi_j^{\sigma-1}(\tau_{jn}w_j)^{1-\sigma}} & (\forall i, j) \\ E_n(w_n) = w_n L_n & (\forall i, \text{ balance budegt}) \end{cases}$$

General Equilibrium (in terms of *Y*)

For a given vector of parameters, $\{\tau_{in}, \varphi_i, f_i, L_i, \sigma\}_{i,n}$, equilibrium is a vector of GDP levels, $\{Y_i\}_i$, that clear labor markets in all countries:

$$\sum_{n=1}^{N} \underbrace{\lambda_{in}(Y_1, ..., Y_N) \times E_n(Y_n)}_{\text{country } n's \text{ demand for } i's \text{ labor services}} = Y_i \quad , \forall i$$

where the expenditure shares (λ_{in}) and total national expenditure (E_n) are given by

$$\begin{cases} \lambda_{in}(Y_1, ..., Y_N) = \frac{\left(L_i^{\sigma}/f_i\right)\varphi_i^{\sigma-1}(\tau_{in}Y_i)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^N \left(L_j^{\sigma}/f_j\right)\varphi_j^{\sigma-1}(\tau_{jn}Y_j)^{1-\sigma}} & (\forall i, j) \\ E_n(Y_n) = Y_n & (\forall i, \text{ balance budegt}) \end{cases}$$

An Overview of the Krugman Model

- The Krugman model belongs to the quantitative class of models reviewed earlier:

$$ilde{\chi}_i \sim f_i^{-1} \left(L_i^{rac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} arphi_i
ight)^{\sigma-1}$$
 , $arepsilon \sim \sigma-1$

- The indirect utility or welfare of the representative consumer in country i is

$$W_{i} = \frac{Y_{i}}{P_{i}}, \qquad P_{i} = \left[\sum_{n=1}^{N} \int_{\omega \in \Omega_{n}} p_{ni} (\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

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$$W_{i} = \frac{Y_{i}}{P_{i}}, \qquad P_{i} = C \times \left[\sum_{n=1}^{N} \varphi_{n}^{\sigma-1} L_{n}^{\sigma} (f_{n})^{-1} (\tau_{ni} Y_{n})^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

encapsulates non-country-specific constants

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Krugman vs. Neoclassical Trade Models

- The Krugman model predicts similar *ex post* gains from trade (up-to a choice of trade elasticity) as neoclassical models—*e.g.*, Armington, Eaton-Kortum

$$GT_i \equiv \frac{W_i - W_i^{(autarky)}}{W_i} \sim \text{gains from trade}$$

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- It also predict the same *ex ante* welfare impacts in response to a trade cost shock $\{\hat{\tau}_{in}\}_{i,n}$:

$$\widehat{W}_{i} = \frac{\widehat{Y}_{i}}{\widehat{P}_{i}}, \qquad \qquad \widehat{P}_{i} = \left[\sum_{n} \lambda_{ni} \,\widehat{\tau}_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \,\widehat{Y}_{n}^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

where \widehat{Y}_i can be calculated with data on basline expenditure shares, $\{\lambda_{in}\}_{i,n}$, and GDP levels, $\{Y_i\}_i$, via the following system:

$$\widehat{Y}_{i}Y_{i} = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left[\frac{\lambda_{in} \, \widehat{\tau}_{in}^{1-\sigma} \, \widehat{Y}_{i}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} \lambda_{jn} \, \widehat{\tau}_{jn}^{1-\sigma} \, \widehat{Y}_{j}^{1-\sigma}} \widehat{Y}_{n} Y_{n} \right]$$

Real GDP and Size: Krugman vs. Armington


- Real GDP is characterized by technology parameters, size, and, trade openness:

$$\frac{Y_{i}}{P_{i}} = \underbrace{\frac{\varphi_{i}}{\tau_{ii} \left(\sigma f_{i}\right)^{\sigma-1}} \times L_{i}^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \times \lambda_{ii}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}_{\text{Krugman}},$$

$$\frac{Y_i}{P_i} = \underbrace{\frac{A_i \beta_i}{\tau_{ii}} \times L_i \times \lambda_{ii}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}_{\text{Armington}}$$

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
- The Krugman model predicts that, all else equal, real GDP (Y/P) increases more than proportional with population size (*L*):

$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial \ln (Y_i/P_i)}{\partial \ln L_i} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} > 1}_{\text{Krugman}};$$

$$\frac{\frac{\partial \ln \left(Y_i/P_i\right)}{\partial \ln L_i} = 1}{\frac{A \operatorname{rmington}}{A \operatorname{rmington}}}$$

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
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$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial \ln \left(Y_i/P_i\right)}{\partial \ln L_i} = 1}_{\text{Armington}}$$

- Why? because of increasing-returns to scale, driven by love-for-variety.

Are the Scale Effects Predicted by Krugman Consistent with Data?



Are the Scale Effects Predicted by Krugman Consistent with Data?

- Cross-sectional data suggests that $\frac{\partial \ln(Y_i/P_i)}{\partial \ln L_i} < 1$, but does it reject the presence of scale economies?
- Not necessarily, because larger countries have higher domestic expenditures shares $(\frac{\partial \ln \lambda_{ii}}{\partial \ln L_i} > 0)$ and presumably larger domestic trade frictions $(\frac{\partial \ln \tau_{ii}}{\partial \ln L_i} > 0)$:

$$\frac{d\ln(Y_i/P_i)}{d\ln L_i} = \frac{\partial\ln(Y_i/P_i)}{\partial\ln L_i} + \underbrace{\frac{\partial\ln(Y_i/P_i)}{\partial\ln\tau_{ii}}}_{=-1} \underbrace{\frac{d\ln\tau_{ii}}{d\ln L_i}}_{>0} + \underbrace{\frac{\partial\ln(Y_i/P_i)}{\partial\ln\lambda_{ii}}}_{=1/(1-\sigma)<0} \underbrace{\frac{d\ln\lambda_{ii}}{d\ln L_i}}_{>0}$$

- See Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare, & Saborío-Rodríguez (2016, AER) for a formal exploration of the income-size elasticity puzzle.